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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

HYRUM WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-

vs.-

THE OGDEN UNION RAIL.WAY
AND DEPOT COMPANY, a corporation,

Case No.
7471'

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The parties will be designated as in the trial court.
All italics are ours.
All record citations of testimony will be followed
by -1 or -2 to indicate whether said testimony was received at the first or second trial.
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Hyrum Williams., an employee of The Ogden Union
Railway and Depot Company, was injured within defendant's ·yards at Ogden, Weber County, Utah, at approximately 7 :10 A.M. on the 9th day of D-ecember, 1946
while in the course of his employment as a switch tender
for said company.
This action was commenced in the Second Judicial
District, in and for Weber County, State of Utah, on
the 26th day of February, 1948. The case was first
tried before the Honorable John A. Hendricks, commencing on the 26th day of May, 1948, the jury returning
a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $20,000.00
total verdict, with diminution by reason of contributory
negligence in the sum of $8,000.00, .and a net verdict in
the sum of $12,000.00 (R. 057).
Defendant filed a motion for new trial and said
Judge, after the motion had been argued by respective
counsel, granted plaintiff the choice of accepting a
$9,000.00 reduction in the net verdict, leaving a net
recovery of $3,000.00, or a new trial. Plaintiff, faced
with this choice, accep·ted a new trial (R. 240-2).
The case was tried a second time before the Honorable F. W. Keller, commencing on the 16th day of
November, 1948, the jury returning a verdict of No
Cause for .Action in favor of the defendant and against
the plaintiff. Thereafter, plaintiff moved for . a new
trial and plaintiff's motion was, on the 29th day of
September, 1949, denied by said Judge (R. 245-2).
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Plaintiff hereby appeals fron1 the order of ,Judg'l'
Hendrieks granting· defendant's n1otion for nP\Y trial
and also from eertain errors eormnitted by the I-Ionorable
F. ,,.... Keller, Judge during the progress of thP second
trial of the case.
The facts pertaining to liability 'Yill be related upon
the basis of the testimony at the second trial inasinuch
as certain errors of la".,.' \Yhich "Till be set forth and discussed in this brief, took place at the second trial.
The facts pertaining to damages \Yill be related
upon the basis of the testimony taken at the first trial
inasmuch as those facts will be referred to in relation to
charged error of Judge Hendricks in granting defendant's motion for new trial following the first trial of
this cause.

B. THE FACTS
Hyrum Williams, age 68, and a lifetime employee
of the defendant company, was injured while in the
course of his employment at app·roximately 7 :10 A.M.
on the 9th day of December, 1946 when he slipi>·ed on
icy switch ties while manipulating railroad switch No.
2 near the Weber River bridge, Ogden, Utah (R. 15-2,
20-2). At the time of his injuries plaintiff was working
as a switch tender tending three switches, one east, and
two west of the Weber River bridge (R. 2, R-2). He
had worked pursuant to said assignment since 1942.
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The tracks, switches and general area where plaintiff worked are clearly shown in defendant's Exhibit
'' 1' '. <i enerally speaking the we·stbound and eastbound
main line tracks extend in an easterly-westerly direction,
with the westbound main line track to the south. These
tracks extend over the Weber River by a bridge and a
short distance east of the bridge the balloon track circles
a \\~ay from the westbound main line track in a general
southeasterly direction. West of the Weber River bridge
a crossover, extending in southeasterly-northwesterly
direction, connects the westbound and eastbound main
line tracks. Switch No. 1 connects the crossover with
the eastbound main line track and switch No. 2 connects
the crossover with the westbound main line track and
is the switch where plaintiff was injured. A switch
shanty is located just south of the crossover. The balloon switch is approximately three-quarters of a block

from the shanty (R. 19-2).
During the months and years prior to December
9 1946 an average of between eight and ten trains
'
'
would
pass
the switches over which plaintiff had jurisdiction during an eight hour shift. Every time these
trains moved along the eastbound or westbound main
line tracks the duty of the switch tender required that
he manipulate the switches under his control so as to
accommodate the movement of these trains (R. 8-2).
Whenever a train used the crossover, switches Nos. 1
and 2 would have to be changed :and then returned to
their normal positions (R. 1~-2).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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. .\t all times it is the duty of the section rrt)\vs, working under the section foreman to keep the switches and
the area around the s'vitches clean and in good working
condition (R. 11, 12, 89-92, 145-147-2). If it snows and
storms, section cre,vs are railed out as soon as ~possible
to clean the s"\vitches and the area around the switches
where workmen are required to stand or move in the
manipulation of the switches (R. 11, 12, 90, 91, 145-2).
David Danielson, section foreman in general charge
of maintenance work from Roy, Utah to Weber River
bridge, within which area is located switches Nos. 1 and
2, testified that following a storm on the 7th day of
December, 1946 he dispatched a member of his crew
to clean five switches, two of which were switches Nos.
1 and 2, and that his workman spent six hours on that
day cleaning the switches (R. 213-2). On the 8th day
of December, 1946 there was some precipitation of wet
snow which ended at approximately 12:45 P.M. This
was the last precipitation that occurred before plaintiff
was injured. (Exs. "L", "M" and "13"). Thereafter,
Mr. Danielson dispatched a man to clean the five
switches, among which w-ere switches Nos. 1 a.nd 2, and
he worked fo.r a period of six hours during the afternoon of December 8th, 1946 on said assignment (R. 213,
215, 216-2). During the evening of the 8th and the early
morning hours of the 9th the temp,erature hovered at or
near freezing (Exs. "L ", "M" and "13 ").
On the 9th day of December, 1946, plaintiff reported
for duty at approximately 6:50 to 6:55 A. M. (R. 15-2).
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It \\'as a dark, cloudy morning, below freezing in temperature (R. 15, 16-2). His shift was from 7:00 A.M.
to 3 :00 P.M. Upon reporting for duty plaintiff received
noti(·P that passenger train No. 30 was on the balloon
traek Past of the Weber River bridge ready to proceed
in a westerly direction along the westbound main line
track across the crossover and onto the eastbound main
line track, and also that extra freight train No. 5300
"·as approaching along the westbound main line track
in an easterly direction. His duty therefore required
him to stop the freight train, manipulate the switches
necessary for the movement of the passenger train
from the balloon track to the westbound main line track,
over the crossover, to the eastbound main line track
and to then change the switches in order that the freight
train could proceed along its course on the westbound
main line track. In addition, another train at Patterson
Avenue was waiting until the manipulations, heretofore
mentioned, had_ been completed so that it could proceed
along its course (R. 20-2). Plaintiff, therefore, with
his lantern in hand, walked three-quarters of a block
from the shanty to the balloon switch, changed that
switch, returned to No. 2 switch, changed it, then to the
No. 1 switch, changed it, and the 'IJassenger train proceeded along its course. Thereafter, plaintiff relined
No. 1 switch to its normal position, proceeded to No. 2
switch, and while manipulating it, was U]jured (R.
15-17-2).
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He testified regarding the happening of the accident as follo"~s (R. 20-2):

'•Q. .A.s you approached switch No. 2 I want
you to tell the jury what you did .
.A.. I "~alked from switch No. 1 to s\vitch
No. 2 to line it up for the '''"est bound main line.
By doing so that cleared the block to let that
eastbound train out of the east yard. But I never
completed throwing the S"\Yitch.

Q. Did you get the switch handle unlocked 1
A. I got the switch unlocked and the handle
out of the lever and was in a position to throw,
I just started to throw the switch when my feet
slipped out from under me and I went between
the switch rod and the tie.''

.. .

"A. Just as soon as I lifted the handle out
there, the switch handle, why I grabbed the stand
and throwed the switch around where my feet
was on the switch ties and this leg went, the left
leg went between the switch tie and the switch
rod throwing me off balance and I fell forward,
or toward the right and the east. Fell towards
the bridge.

Q. Will you step down, Mr. Williams, and
in about the position I am in now or whatever
position is best for you and use this 'P'ointer and
demonstrate to the jury how this- accident happened, the actual movements you went through
and what happened~
A. If that is the switch stand, take that for
the switch stand, I come here and unlock the
switch and let the switch lock down on its chain·
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and pull the handle out. After you pull the handle
?ut it is generally so tight in the stock rail that
1t lets the handle come around but then you get
hold of t~e handle this way, standing in that
position, and pull it just. around and put it down
in the ratchet.
Q. And about how far did you pull the handle
"·hen you slipped on this occasion~

A. Oh, I don't know how far just exactly
what you'd say it was. The two ratchets, it is
just about a 40 degree, took it out of one ratchet
and put it in the next one so the switch comes
here and it has got to come around to here.''
Plaintiff is a man 5 feet 5 inches in height, weighing
approximately 150 to 155 pounds, and wearing a size
6'% shoe. There was sufficient space for his foot to slip
bet,veen the switch tie and the bridle rod (R. 43, 44-2).
Switchmen, in manipulating switches, adopt the
means of manipulation most convenient for them. There
are no rules or regulations as to how a man should
stand in manipulating the switches (R. 46, 52, 53; 178,
179, 201, 202, 205-2). Plaintiff had seen other men stand
on the switch ties in manipulating the switch on frequent occasions (R. 46-2), as had Beckett, a switchman
with 28 years experience, who testified on behalf of
plaintiff. Beckett himself had handled switches in a
similar manner (R. 13'6-138-2).
On the morning he was injured p~laintiff was wearing a pair of shoes and new rubbers and was heavily
· clothed because of the weather (R. 24-2). He had not
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noticed ire on the ties and around the S\Yiteh bPfore he
"·as injured for the reason that he had only bPPn on
shift approximately ten Ininutes and had been Yery bu~y
manipulating S\Yitrhes in order to facilitatP the moYement of the t"~o trains 'Yaiting for hin1 to aecon1plish
his 'York (R. 45-2). He had stood on the 0 pposite 8it1P
of S\Yitch ~ o. 2 in thro,ving it earlier for the crossoYer.
After plaintiff had slipped and fallen he observed a
layer of ice on the switch ties and around the switch
(R. 50-2).
1

Beckett, learning that plain tiff had been injured,
examined switch No. 2 shortly after 8 :00 o'clock· on the
same morning and .testified that the switch ties were
covered with ice and a little snow, and that the area
around the switch was covered with snow (R. 141-143-2).
Photographs produced by the defendant and identified
as having been taken at 9 :00 A.M. on the day ·plaintiff
was injured clearly and irrefutably indicate that ice and
snow were on the ties where plaintiff was injured. Mr.
Beckett identified Exhibits "I", '' J" and "K" as
showing the area as it existed that morning.
That the defendant had had adequate time within
which to render plaintiff's place of work s.afe, was clear.
No precipitation had occurred for over 18 hours before
plaintiff was injured. During that time no salt nor sand
had been thrown on the ties or in the area of the switch;
no effort had been made to remove the ice or snow by
means of a shovel which was located at the switch shanty;
no call had been issued for the section crew to perform
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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this work, and the two switch tenders who preceded
'plaintiff on the job had made no effort to clean the
switch ties or the area around the switches (R. 90 91-2
' '
Exhibits "9", "10", R. 107, 146, 147-2). The switch
shanties at other areas of the yard contained salt and
sand for use in providing adequate footing following
storms (R. 107-2).
;Beckett testified upon the basis of 28 years of experience that when he observed a condition of ice and
snow around a switch rendering footing insecure, he
deemed it his duty to immediately notify the section
foreman or chief in charge of the department to come
and clean the switch and area, ·and that it was a common
occurrence for section men to be called out during the
night to perform such services (R. 146, 147-2). Section
crews were on 24 hour call at all times (R. 215, 216-2).
From the foregoing facts it is obvious that plaintiff
on duty for ten minutes, confronted with .an emergency
on a dark cold morning had no time nor means within

'

'

which to examine the switches or determine whether
footing was safe and secure. On the other hand the
defendant had more than sufficient time and means
to have rendered footing ~ecure. During that time
one man h.ad speJ:!.t 6 hours on five switches. From
the photographs it is obvious that the switch- points
and the moving parts of the switch had been cleaned
since the storm. It is also obvious that the area where
switchmen were required to stand and move in manipSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ulating the sw·itrh had been OYt:\rlookt'd ( SPP Photographs).
After he "~as injured plaintiff railed for help and
R. 0. McBride, head brakeman of the freight train, a·pproaehed the s'Yitch "-here he "~as lying, picked hint
up and carried hin1 to the shanty (R. 197 -·~). l\IcBride
later relined the s"itch himself (R. 198-2).
Plaintiff remained at the shanty and endured extensive pain for 30 to 40 minutes before the ambulance
arrived and removed him to the hospital (R. 48-1).
After his arrival at the hospital he was taken to the
operating room where he remained approximately 45
minutes to an hour while the doctor was applying a
cast. During that time he endured extensive ·pain (R.
49-1).

Dr. L. S. Sycamore testified that plaintiff had sustained a comminuted oblique fracture of the left tibia
approximately three or four inches below the knee. That
the fragments were in reasonably good position and
alignment, with slight posterior displacement of- the
distal fragments -at the time he applied the cast. There
were two fractures approximately one . inch apart
through the bone, slanting slightly (R. 24-26-1). Plaintiff remained in bed at the hospital for ten days, and
on the tenth day was allowed out of bed for short periods
of time (R. 27-1). On December 23, 1946 he was allowed
to leave the hospital (R. 27-1). On January 7, 1947
X-rays were taken showing the bone to be in good position and the fracture line to be still quite distinct with
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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no bony union (R. 28-1). On January 31, 1947 X-rays
were again taken revealing some callous formation but
also revealing that bony union was not complete (R.
29-1). On February 20, 1947 X-rays revealed callous
forrnation and early incomplete bony union (R. 29-1).
Approximately three months following his injuries the
first cast was removed. Plaintiff was seen on March
2;) by the doctor. At that time the fracture seemed to
lH· healing and he was able to walk on crutches and to
lJ(•ar weight for a few moments of time (R. 30-1). In
!\fay of 1947 plaintiff again contacted Dr. Sycamore
complaining of pain around the bone. X-r.ays revealed
a fracture line extending through the callous formation
as though a small amount of motion in the area had been
present (R. 31-1). On May 26, 1947 plaintiff was hospitalized for a period of 24 hours during which time
another cast covering his leg and foot was appJied
(R. 32-1). On June 30, 1947 X-rays revealed that the
fracture line was becoming partially obliterated, and
during the latter part of July or first part of August,
1947 the second cast was removed (R. 32-1).
Dr. Sycamore accounted for the re-fracture as being
caused either by another injury or some slight torque
in the leg at the time the first cast had been applied
which didn't allow complete healing. He was unable to
testify as to which of these reasons was more predominant (R. 36-1). Plaintiff himself testified that he had
suffered no injuries or fall whatsoever following his
injury on D-ecember 9, 1946 (R. 51-1).
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During the long •period of tinH:~ that his lt'g had been
in the casts plaintiff's n1uscles had atrophit:\d extpnsively
and there was tenderness and pain and con1plete lack
of strength in his left leg as late as September of
1947 (R. 32, 51-52-1). He followed the doctor's instructions regarding massage and exercising implicitly (R.
53-1). However, on September 3, 1947 he was sent to
Salt Lake to the Chief Surgeon because of continued
complaints of stiffness and soreness around the knee
and ankle (R. 33-1).
Plaintiff testified that during the periods of time
that his leg was in a cast and thereafter he endured
extreme discomfort, anguish, nervousness .and sleeplessness (R. 51-1). At the time of the first trial, more
than fifteen months after his injury, he was unable to
walk more than three or four blocks without extreme
fatigue in his left leg and testified that under no circumstance could he perform the duties of a switch tender
(R. 55-1). Because of retarded recovery and inability
to perform the duties of his employment, Mr. Williams
had been forced to retire from railroading (R. 54, 55-1).
The superintendent had informed him that he had no
alternative but to retire (R. 54-1).
At tp.e time of his injuries plaintiff was earning
between $250.00 and $260.00 ~er month (R. 56-1).
Defendant offered no evidence on damages, and the
testimony of Dr. Sycamore, plaintiff, .and his daughter,
remains as the sole and only testimony concerning
that subject.
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From the foregoing facts it is clear that plaintiff's
causP of action rests upon a firm evidentiary basis and
that he suffered and sustained very serious disabling
lllJUl'leH.

I>laintiff proposes to show that he was seriously
prejudiced by errors which occurred at the first and
second trials of his cause.
STATEMENT OF POINTS

'

1. The trial court erred at the second trial in refusing to give plaintiff's Instruction No. 4.
')

The trial court erred at the second trial in refus-

ing to give plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 5.
3. T-he trial court erred at the second trial in giving
Instruction No. 7 wherein it defined "proximate cause."
4. The trial court erred at the second trial in giving Instruction No. 10.
5. The trial court erred at the second trial in giv-

ing Instruction No. 11.
6. The trial court erred at the second trial in giving Instruction No. 12.
7. The trial court erred at the second trial in giving Instruction No. 19.
8. The trial court erred at the second trial in giving Instruction No. 23.
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9. The trial court erred in granting defendant's
motion for a new trial following the first trial.
10. The trial court erred in refusing to grant plaintiff's motion for new trial following the second trial.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT GRANTED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL FOLLOWING THE FIRST
TRIAL (Statement of Points 9).

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AT THE SECOND TRIAL IN REFUSING AND NEGLECTING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY
AS TO PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF LIABILITY
(Statement of Points 1 and 4).
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AT THE SECOND TRIAL IN INSTRUCTION NO. 10 WHEN IT INSTRUCTED THE
JURY THAT''* * * the me.re happening of the accident
to plaintiff is no proof of negligence on the p:a.rt vf either
the plaintiff or defendant or evidence of same.'' (Statement of Points 4).
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POINT IV.
'l'HE ri'RIAL COURT, AT THE SECOND TRIAL
1~\~ U l V lN<} INSTRUCTION NO. 12, HAS REVIVED'
TIll~: DOCTRINE OF CONT~IBUTORY NEGLIa l~~NCE AS A COMPLETE BAR TO RECOVERY BY
PI.JAINTIFF (Statement of Points 6).

POINT V.

THE TRIAL COURT, AT THE SECOND TRIAL,
BY GIY'ING INSTRUCTION NO. 19, PLACED AN
UN\\~ARRANT ED BURDEN OF PROOF UPON THE
SHOULDERS OF PLAINTIF·F AND IN EFFECT
REVIVED THE DOCTRINES OF CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK AS
COMPLETE BARS TO RECOVERY BY PLAINTIFF
(Statement of Points 7).

POINT VI.
THE JURY'S VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO
IMPORTANT UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE
PRESENTED AT THE TRIAL .
.ARGUMENT
POINT I.
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TIO~ FOR XE,\"' 1-,Rl..-\.L FOLLO,YI~"O ~r.II1 1 ~ l1 ,1H~1

1

TRIA.L (State1nent of

Point~

9).

In granting defendant\;: motion for ne'r trial follo\\'ing the first trial the court n1ade the foll<.n,ying statement (R. ~-±0-2) :

"THE COURT: I will tell you that you
needn't argue any further. I am of the opinion
this ,,~as excessiYe, and I am going to make this
ruling: I had some misgivings about the motion
for directed verdict and wondered if I shouldn't
have granted it. I am now convinced that I
should have granted that motion. I think that if
there was negligence, $5,000 'vould have been
sufficient total damages. The jury found that
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence to the extent of 40%. I think this contributory negligence was much more than thatit was over 50%-but I will take it on the basis
of 40% as the jury found, and if the plaintiff
will accept $3,000 I will deny the motion for new
trial; if not, the motion will be granted.
''MR. BLACK: I don't think we will need to
deliberate on that, your Honor. We won't accept
it. We will take a new trial.
''THE COURT: All right, the motion for new
trial is gran ted. ' '
The court's misconception of duty in ruling upon
a motion for new trial is readily apparent from the
foregoing remarks. If the court were of the opinion
that a directed verdict was proper, it was its duty to
have entered an order accordingly in order that such
a ruling could be prop,erly reviewed by an .appellate
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court. The court however, made no such order. Rather,
it chose to find that the jury's verdict was based upon
1)assion or prejudice.
The jury's total verdict was $20,000.00. The sum
of $8,000,00 was deducted for contributory negligence,
leaving a net verdict of $12,000.00. The narrow question
before this court is whether the trial court abused its
discretion in finding that the verdict w.as based on
passion and prejudice and, upon the basis of that finding, confronting plaintiff with the inequitable burden
of accepting either a $9,000.00 reduction in the total
verdict or a new trial.
It is manifestly clear that the discretionary tpower
of trial courts in granting or denying a motion for new .
trial is not a mental discretion giving effect to the will
of the judge, but is a legal discretion to be exercised in
conformity with the spirit and letter of the law.

Utah Code Annotated, 1943, Sec. 104-40-2, reads as
follows:
''Grounds.
''The former verdict or other decision may be
vacated and a new trial granted on the app~ica
tion of the party aggrieved, for any of the follo~
ing causes materially affecting the substantial
rights of such party:

* * * * * *
'' (5) Excessive damages, appearing to have

been given under the influence of passion or
prejudice. ''
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Under the foregoing statute unless tht~ rt\eord and
testimony at the trial fully justifiPs a finding- by thP
trial court that the jury "~as motiYa ted hy passion anc l
prejudice the trial court's action in granting a n1otion
for new trial or remitting a portion of the vt}rdiet
constitutes an abuse of discretion and is nothing short
of a capricious and arbitrary exercise of po\YPr. This
court has so stated in the case of Jensen v. Denver & R.
G. R. Co., 44 Utah 100, 138 P. 1185, 1192, and has clearly
affirm~d its power and duty of reviewing the trial court's
action in requiring a remission or a new trial. The
following language clearly expresses the Utah law on
this subject:
''Since statehood, and as announced in Nichols
v. Railroad, 28 Utah, 319, 78 Pac. 866, it has
repea_tedly and uniformly been held 'that the
amount of the verdict, under our Constitution,
is a matter wholly within the province of the trial
court and jury; the same being a question of
fact. Where, as here, there is any evidence to
support the verdict, we have no power to pass
upon it or to set the verdict aside as being excessive.' In Budd v. Salt Lake City Ry. Co., 23
Utah, 515, 65 Pac. 486, it was said that it was
'useless to longer incumber the records with
such questions in such cases'; in Burt v. Utah
Light & P. Co., 26 Utah, 157, 72 Pac. 497, that
this court is unauthorized 'to review the evidence
to determine whether or not the damages are
excessive.' To the same effect are Brregger v.
Railroad, 24 Utah, 391, 68 Pac. 140, Palmquist
v. M. & M. Supply Co., 25 Utah, 257, 70 Pac. 994,
and Railroad v. Russell, 27 Utah, 457, 7'6 Pac. 345.
In these cases many other prior cases from this
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jurisdiction are cited to the same effect. A rule
so long and so firmly settled as this will not now
be disturbed. The verdict is for $7,620. The
defendant urges that, while there may be evidence
to sup~port a verdict for compensatory damages
for some substantial amount, yet there is no
evidence to support this verdict, a verdict for
$7,620. The argument but amounts to the claim
that the verdict is excessive; that the amount
rendered is greater than or in excess of that
justified by the evidence. Of course·-neither party
is e·ntitled to our judgment of what we, on the
evidence, think the damages should be. "\Ve are
not the tribunal to measure that or to pass judgment on it, and cannot review the evidence for
any such purpose.
''Neither is either party on that question
entitled to· the judgment of the court below in
a case of tort tried to a jury. Both parties, as
to that, are entitled to the unprejudiced judgment of the jury. That is exclusively within their
province. Their power and discretion, when prop·erly exercised and when they have been properly
directed .as to the measure of damages and the
mode of assessing it, may not be interfered with
merely because the court above or below may
think the amount rendered is too large, or even
may think it ap,pears to he larger than the evidence apparently or fairly justifies. A court,
vac.ating a verdict and granting a new trial by
me.rely setting up his opinion or judgment against
that of the jury, but usurp·s judicial power and
prostitutes the constitutional trial by jury. Still
the jury cannot be permitted to g'o unbridled and
wnchecked. Hence the :Code that a new trial on
motion of the aggrieved party may be gr.anted
by the court below on the ground of 'excessive
damages appearing to have been given wnder
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the influence of passion or prejudice.' Whenever that is made to appear, the court, when its
action is properly invoked, should require a remission or set the ve.rdict .aside and grant a neu;
trial. But, before the court is justified to do that,
it should clearly be made to appear that the jury
totally mistook or disregarded the rules of law
by 1vhich the damages were to be regulated, o.r
wholly misconceived or disregarded all the evidence, and by so doing committed gross and
palpable error by rendering a verdict so enormous
o.r outrageous or unjust as to be attributable
to neither the charge nor the evidence, but only
to passion or prejudice. Whether a new trial
should or .should not be granted on this ground,
of necessity, must largely rest within the. sound
discretion of the t.rial court .
"Still that court, in such particular, is not
supreme or beyond reach. Its action may nevertheless be inquired into and reviewed on an
alleged abuse of discretion, o.r a .capricious or
arbitrary exercise of power in such respect. Such
a review is not a review of a question of fact,
but of law. A ruling granting or refusing a
motion fo.r a new trial is certainly reviewable
when the proceedings with respect to it are properly preserved and presented.- That has not been
questioned. Of course the ruling will not be disturbed on evidence in conflict, or on matters involving discretion. Yet our power to correct a
plain .abuse of discretion or undo a mere capricious or arbitrary exercis·e of power cannot be
doubted.
''We have said this much, in view of plaintiff's contention and of opinions heretofore somewhat loosely expressed at the bar, that in a case
of tort tried to a jury, no matter how enormous
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or flagrantly outrageous a verdict may be, the
trial court alone is authorized to grant relief;
and though that court may, by a clear .abuse of
discretion, and by an arbitrary exercise of power,
have gone as wild as did the jury and suffered
an outrageous .and unjust verdict to stand, or
on mere whimsi'Cal and capricious grounds set
a verdict aside amply supp~orted by competent
evidence, yet we are pow·erless to interfere. We
do not so understand the prior decisions. In all
of them where it was said this court is not
authorized to review a question of excessive damages, such question being one of fact, the statements are qualified, except to ascertain 'if there
is any evidence to support the verdict,' 'except
so far as may be necessary to determine questions of law.' We reaffirm that. And since an
assignment based on a ruling alleged to have
been made by an abuse of discretion or by a mere
capricious or arbitrary exercise of power, in
granting or refusing a new trial, presents a
question of law, not of fact, we may as such
review it.''
The question then arises as to what facts and
circumstances in the case at bar justified Judge
Hendricks in concluding that the jury's verdict was
based upon passion and p~rejudice.
The. evidence revealed that Hyrum Williams suffered a very serious injury. The tibia, or weight-bearing
bone of his left leg, was fractured in two places. He
was hospitalized for a period of two weeks. A plaster
cast was .applied. On January 31, 1947, almost two
months following his injury, no bony union had occurred. On February 20, 1947 bony union was still
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incomplete. Three months after his InJury the doctor
removed the cast, but on May 26, 1947 an X-ray again
showed separation at the fracture site and another
cast was placed upon his leg. On June 30, 1947 bony
union was incomplete. On September 3, 1947, almost
nine months following his injury, plaintiff was still
unable to be on his leg for more than short p·eriods
of time. He still suffered from extreme stiffness and
soreness around the knee and ankle and his leg had
atrophied extensively.
At the time of the first trial, on February 26, 1948,
almost 15 months following his injury, he was unable
to walk more than 3 or 4 blocks at a time and testified
that he was still physically unfit to perform the duties
of a switch tender.
His lost wages alone, up to the time of trial,
amounted to $3,900.00.
Based upon the foregoing evidence the trial court
determined that the verdict was ''so enormous or outrageous or unjust as to be attributable to neither the
charge nor the evidence, but only to passion or prejudice.''
It was the trial court's opinion that Hyrum Williams
would have been entitled to a maximum of $1,100.00
for 15 months of pain, suffering and loss of bodily
function and for the pain, suffering, loss of bodily
function and loss of wages he would undoubtedly suffer
in the future. Think of it! $1,100 a legal maximu1n
which the jury would be allowed to award plaintiff
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for this serious cr~ppling injury. Is it any wonder that
counsel for the plaintiff demanded a change of judge
at the conclusion of these p~roceedings ~ If the jury
had been influenced and motivated by passion and prejudice, why then would they have reduced the ve~dict
in the amount of $8,000.00 for contributory negligence¥
The jury at all times during the progress of the trial
listened attentively to the evidence, deliberated for more
than an hour and forty-five minutes before returning
the verdict, and in no manner whatsoever indicated that
it was prejudiced or biased either for or against the
plaintiff. On the other hand, it seems inconceivable that
the trial court viewing the evidence on damages could
have determined that a maximum of $1,100.00 for pain,
suffering, and loss of bodily function, past and future,
would be allowed by the court. If this be not an abuse
of judicial discretion, what must the record reveal to
establish abuse of legal discretion~ Had the court
reduced the verdict by a lesser sum perhaps a different
situation would have been presented, but here is a court
that without any justification whatsoever reduces the
jury's verdict by three-fourths, thereby giving to plaintiff only a little over three-fourths of what he actually
lost in wages, completely disregarding 'Pain ·and suffer.
ing, loss of bodily function, both past and future, and
comp~letely disregarding future lost wages.
We submit that substantial rights were denied plaintiff by the court'·s arbitrary abuse of discretion in
requiring plaintiff to accept a remittitur of $9,000.00 or
~a new trial. It is manifestly clear that the discretion
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exercised by the trial court 'vas not the legal discretion
contemplated by our statutes and by the decisions of
this Honorable Court, but 'Yas a discretion which gave
effect solely to the "~in of the judge trying the case with
utter and complete disregard for the uncontroverted
evidence presented by plaintiff.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AT THE SECOND TRIAL IN REFUSING AND NEGLECTING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY
AS TO PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF LIABILITY
(Statement of Points 1 .and 4).
There are no instructions given by the court which
either alone, or in conjunction with each other, contain
plaintiff's theory of recovery.
Instruction No. 2 states:

" * * * that a railroad company while engaged
in interstate commerce shall be .liable jn damages
to an employee suffering injuries while he is
employed by such company in interstate commerce in cases where such injury results in
whole or in part from the railroad· company's
negljgence. * * * ' '

Instruction No. 9 reads as follows:
''The plaintiff alleges that the defendant was
guilty of negligence jn failing to furnish the
plaintiff .a safe place to work, in the following
particular :
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''That the defendant allowed the ties on which
the switch was located to hecome and remain
covered with snow and ice, which caused them
to be in a slick and slippery and unsafe condition.
''These allegations of negligence .are denied
by the defendant. Defendant alleges that the
plaintiff's injuries were the result of his own
negligence.''
Instruction No. 10 reads as follows :
"The jury is instructed that the mere happening of the accident to plaintiff is no proof of
negligence on the part of either the plaintiff or
def.endant or evidence of same. Negligence is
never presumed, but must be proved to your
satisfaction by a preponderance of the evidence.
Before the plaintiff can recover in this case the
jury must believe from a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant was negligent in the
manner set forth in Instruction No. 9 and that
such negligence was a proximate cause of his
.accident.''
Instructions No. 9 and No. 10, as hereinabove set
forth, do not, either directly or by implication, state
the duty defendant owed plaintiff and the violation, if
any, which would constitute negligence and require a
verdict in plaintiff's favor. These instructions approach
the matter from the negative point of view and rather
than setting forth plaintiff's theory of recovery they
set forth defendant's theory of defense.
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The only instruction "~ht'rein the duty owed plaintiff is discussed in Instruction No. 20. This instruction
is set forth as follo,vs :
''You are instructed that it was the duty of
the defendant railroad com pany to exercise reasonable care to provide its employees a reasonably safe place to work. This duty does not
require the absolute elimination of all danger,
but only requires the elimination of dangers which
the exercise of reasonable care would remove or
guard against.''
1

It will be observed that Instruction No. 20 is disassociated with Instructions No. 9 and No. 10. Instruction No. 20 is in the exact language of defendant's
Requested Instruction No. 4. How can it be argued
in good common sense that such a p·resentation in
negative fashion, contained in four separate instructions, is a compliance with the fundamental rule of
law that each party is entitled to have his theory which
is supported by the evidence presented to the j-q.ry in
a clear and concise instruction~
The jury was told that the mere happening of the
accident was no proof of negligence or evidence of
same and that before plaintiff could recover the jury
must find from a preponderance of evidence that the
defendant was negligent as set forth in Instruction
No. 9. The jury was not told that if they did find the
facts to be as set forth in Instruction No. 9 they must
find the issues in favor of plaintiff and against the de:
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fendant. At no place in the entire set of instructions was
the jury told that if the ties and area .around the ties,
where plaintiff was required to locate himself in manipulating the switch, had become and remained covered
with snow and ice and slick .and slippery, and that such
condition was a cause, in whole or in part, of plaintiff's
injuries, they were under a duty to find the issues in
favor of plaintiff. We submit that plaintiff's theory
of recovery could not have been presented to the jury
in any manner other than by apprising the jury in
clear language of the duty defendant owed, and of the
violation as applied to the facts, w~ich, if proved, would
require a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
On the other hand, we invite the court's attention
to instructions which contained defendant's theory of
defense. The court, in Instruction No. 18 for example,
· sets forth the duty plaintiff owed of exercising reasonable care for his own safety; sets forth the conduct on
the part of plaintiff, from which the jury could find
plain tiff negligent and that if this negligence was the
sole proximate eause of his injuries, the verdict should
be ''No Cause of Action.'' Instruction No. 18 is herein
set forth for the convenience of the court:
"You are instructed that it is the duty of
every employee to exercise reasonable care for his
own safety. Therefore, if you believe from the
evidence in this case that the plaintiff in manipulating the switch which he was to turn failed to
watch where he was about to step, and you further
find that such f.ailure on his part was negligence
as in these instructions defined, and if you further .
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believe from the evidence that such negligence on
his part was the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, then I instruct you that it is your
duty to find the issue-s against the p·laintiff and
in favor of the defendant and your verdict should
be 'no cause of action'."
Plaintiff's violation of duty and the mandate of
"No Cause of Action" if such violation was the sole
cause of his injuries, '""ere all clearly and succinctly set
forth in one instruction. Is not plaintiff entitled to the
same privilege~ Instructions bearing on defendant's
various theories of defense are found at other places in
the set of instructions and are herein set forth for
the convenience of the court.
"INSTRUCTION NO. 17
''The court charges you that if you believe
from the evidence that the injuries sustained
by the plaintiff happened to him by a mere accident, or that the proximate cause of his injuries
was due to his own negligence without negligence
on the part of the defendant proximately contributing to his injury, then your verdict must
be for the defendant.''
''INSTRUCTION NO. 19
''You are instructed that where an em'Ployee
has two ways of performing an act in the course
of his employment, the one safe and the other
dangerous, the employee owes a duty to exercise
reasonable and ordinary care to discover and
use the safe way of performing such duty. Therefore, if you find that the plaintiff could have
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manipulated said switch while standing on cinders
and gravel and tha,t such a position was reasonably safe and the plaintiff by the exercise of
reasonable and ordinary care would have discover-ed such safe way of operating the switch,
but nevertheless chose a position on the ties
which he as a reasonable and prudent switchman
should have known were slippery and dangerous, then the plaintiff would be guilty of negligence, and if such negligence was the sole proximate cause of the 'Plaintiff's injury, then your
verdict must be for the defendant, no cause for
action.''
The following excerpts from instructions illustrate
plaintiff's contention that defendant's various theories
of defense were not only covered but were unduly,
unnecessarily and erroneously emphasized to plaintiff's
prejudice:

"INSTRUCTION NO. 11
"The jury is instructed that it cannot, in the
performance of its duty as jurors,_ reach a verdict
for the plaintiff in this case if, in order to do so,
it is necessary to rest its verdict upon mere
conjecture and speculation. * * * ''

''INSTRUCTION NO. 12
''The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant was negligent and that such negligence
was a proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff.
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To establish the defense of contributory negligence the burden is upon the defendant to prove,
by a preponderance of evidence, * * * "
It will be noted that the court erroneously states
that contributory negligence is a defense. The error in
this instruction will be discussed under another heading.
''INSTRUCTION NO. 15

'' * * * it is the im•perative and sworn duty
of the jury to hear and determine this case precisely the same as if it were between two individuals. In determining questions of fact you
are not at liberty to indulge in speculation or
conjecture not based on evidence introduced in
the case, nor are you at liberty to follow your
own ideas of what the law is or ought to be.
* * • without reference to the individual or
private character of the plaintiff or the public
or corporate business or character of the defendant * * * You should require as much eviden,ce
to find an issue against a railroad company .as
you would against an individual. A railroad
company is entitled to the same protection of
the law as .an individual. Sympathetic feelings
have no place whatever in the trial of a case
in a court of justice. You should disregard all
such influence and determine the case at bar
according to the law .and the· evidence given
you in open court, regardless of who the parties
are * * * ''

'
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The court erroneously uses the words ''the
proximate cause'' in the instruction. There is no such
thing .as ''the proximate cause'' under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act. All factors contributing to
an accident must, under that law, be considered and
given due weight by the jury in reaching its verdict.

''INSTRUCTION NO. 21
"You are instructed t:P.at plaintiff must exercise reasonable care for his own safety. Therefore, if you believe from a preponderance of the
evidence in this case that plain tiff's injury was
caused by the negligence of the defendant, and
if you further believe that the p~laintiff at the
time and place in question failed to exercise that
degree of care that the ordinary reasonably prudent person would exercise under the same or
similar circumstances, and, further, that such
·failure o~ the part of the ~plaintiff proximately
contributed to cause plaintiff's injury, then the
plaintiff would not be entitled to recover full
damages, but only a diminished sum * * * "

"INSTRUCTION NO. 23.
''The law does not permit you to_ guess or
speculate as to the cause of the accident in ques- tion. If the evidence is equally balanced on the
issue of negligence or proximate cause, so that
it does not preponderate in favor of the party
making the charge, then he has failed to fulfill
his burden of p~roof * * * ''
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The court does not disting~uish betw·een a guess or
speculation and a permissible inference drawn from the
evidence in the case. The instruction unduly emphasizes
the burden resting on plaintiff and to a layman's mind
\Yould indicate that from the ha~ppening of the accident
itself one could not find neglig~ence unless he indulged
in guessing or speculation when as a n1atter of legal
principle a permissive inference could reasonably be
deducted that the place of work was unsafe pecause
slick and slippery and that the defendant was therefore
negligent. This matter will also be discussed under
another heading.
We do not believe that the instructions regarding
plaintiff's theory of liability when comp.ared with the .
instructions containing defendant's theory of defense,
can be read together without the conclusion being drawn
that the court is in effect directing a verdict in favor of
the defendant and against the plaintiff. This jurisdic~
tion has traditionally and without exception condemned
the conduct of trial courts commenting upon the evidence and injecting their own viewpoint as to the
evidence or its weight or sufficiency upon the jury.
The instructions 'pertaining to matters of defense
are cited and discussed to point out the inequity and
unfairness of the instructions as a whole, and also to
emphasize plaintiff's contention that his theory of the
case was not presented in an understandable manner
to the jury.
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Plaintiff made the following requests for instructions:

''PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
IN·STRUCTION NO. 4
"You are instructed that if you find from a
preponderance of the evidence that defendant,
by and through its authorized agents, servants
and employees, knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, that the weather
was at freezing point and that water and snow
around the switch where plaintiff was injured
would be frozen and icy and would render that
locality icy and slippery of footing and that defendant failed and neglected to render such footing safe by cleaning the ice and snow off the
place where switch tenders would in the ordinary
performance of their duties be required to stand,
or by sprinkling salt or sand in the area of said
switch, and that such failure was negligence
which ,proximately caused, in whole or in part, the
injuries to plaintiff, then your verdict should be
in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant
and you should award plaintiff damages in accordance with the instructions herein contained."

''PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 5
"You ~are instructed that it is the duty of the
railroad company to exercise reasonable care to
provide its employees with a safe p·lace to work.
This duty does not require the absolute elimination of all danger, but it does require the elimination of all dangers which. the exercise of reasonable care by the railroad company would remove
or guard against.
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"In this connection you are instructed that if..
you find by a preponderance of the evidence that
defendant failed to furnish plaintiff a reasonably
safe place to work in that it allowed the area where
;plaintiff "\Yas required to station himself to throw
the S"\Yitch to become and remain covered with
ice and snow rendering the footing of plaintiff
and other employees using said switch insecure
and unsafe, and if you further find by a ~pre
ponderance of the evidence that said failure
proximately caused, in whole or in part, the
injuries to plaintiff, then you should return a
verdict in favor of plaintiff and against defendant and award damages to the plaintiff as in
these instructions provided.'·'
The requested instructions were supported by evidence and by the law.
The following cases hold fast to the proposition
that each· party is entitled to have his theory of the
case presented to the jury in a clear and understandable
manner:

In Furkovich v. Bingham Coal and Lumber Co., 45
Utah 89, 143 P. 121, the Court stated:

''A charge should be adapted to the facts and
circumstances of the case on trial and not merely
embody a correct abstract legal principle.''

Toone v. J. P .. O'Neill Const . Co., (Jan. 16, 1912)
40 Utah 265, 121 P. 10, 16. From judgment for the
plaintiff defendant appeals. An action for personal
injuries sustained while plaintiff was an employee of
the defendant. While the court stated that the theory
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of defendant was sufficiently covered by its instruction
and affirmed the judgment, it nevertheless in regard
to the duty of the trial court to instruct properly upon
the theory of each party stated :
''Without now passing upon the question
whether the foregoing instruction was not too
broad in view of the evidence, we concede that a
party is entitled to have his case submitted to the
jury upon the theory of his evidence as well as
upon the theory of the whole evidence. One way
the court might have followed in charging the jury
would have been to charge them in separate instructions, first, in accordance with respondent's
evidence; and, second, in accordance with appellant's evidence which related to the proposition
covered by the instruction in question, and in each
instruction have directed the jury to return a
verdict in accordance with their findings upon
that question. The court was not bound to charge
the jury in separate instructions, but could cover
the question in one without offending against app~ellan t 's rights. ' '
Pratt v. Utah Light J; Traction ,Co.. , (Feb. 5, 1918)
57 Utah 7, 169 P. 868, 869, 870. Action for personal injuries allege4 to ·have been sustained by plaintiff while
~attempting to board a car of defendant company on
Main Street in Salt Lake City. On judgment for plain-

tiff the defendant appeals. Defendant cited as error
refus:al of the trial court to grant his instruction to the
effect that ''if the jury find from the evidence that (plaintiff's injury was not caused by the starting from a position of 'rest of the car of th~. defendant but was caused
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by his acti.on in attempting to boar,d such car while the
same was in motion, then the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover.'' The court, in reversing, stated:

"Each party to a suit is entitled to have his
theory, "'"hen there is evidence to sustain it, submitted to the jury and the judgment of the jury on
the facts tending to support such theory, assuming always that there is testimony offered to
support the same, and this court has so held in
Hartley v. Salt Lake City, 41, Utah, 121, 124
Pac. 522, where, speaking through Straup, J., it
is said:
" 'There are two parties to a lawsuit. Each,
on a submission of the case to the jury, is entitlep
to a submission of it on his theory and the law
in respect thereof. The defendant's theory as
to the cause of the accident is embodied in the
proposed requests. There is some evidence, as
we have shown, to render them applicable to
the case. That is not disputed. We think the
court's refusal to charge substantially as requested .was error. That the ruling was prejudicial and works a reversal of the judgment is self·
evident and unavoidable.'
"To the same effect are the following authorities: Knock v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 214 Mass.
398, 101 N. E. 968; Chicago City· Ry. Co. v. H~a.rry
C. Gates, 135 lll. Ap~p. 180; Patterson v. Electric
Ry. Co., 26 App. Div. 336, 49 N. Y. Supp. 796;
Kaukusch v. Ry. Co., 153 Ill. App. 454; Anderson v. Ry. Co., 36 App. Div. 309, 55 N. Y. Supp.
290; Knoxville Traction Co. v. Carroll, 113 Tenn.
514, 82 S. W. 313; Peck v. St. Louis Transit Co.,
178 Mo. 617, 77 s. -w. 736."
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''Had the court given either of these instructions as requested or in substance and effect, we
should be inclined to hold that the issue presented
by the defendant's answer was sufficiently called
to the ~attention of the jury, and its findings on
that ~particular issue sufficiently determined. But,
as indicated, there is nowhere in the instructions
any direct or concrete statement instructing the
jury that, if they found the facts as claimed by
the defendant, the plaintiff would not be entitled
to recover. This, in our judgment, should have
been done. Where the issues are definite and
direct, and testimony is offered in support of
the different positions taken by the plaintiff and
defendant, the court should, by unequivocal and
unambiguous instructions, direct the jury's attention to the issues of fact as thus presented
to be determined by it, and there seems to be no
good reason why such instructions should not
have been given. Such, in our judgment, was
not done by the court in its instructions in this
case. The requests on the part of the defendant
were seasonably made and were sufficient to
direct the court's attention to the theory of the
defendant's answer, and should have been given,
if not in the words as submitted or requested, at
least in substance and effect.''

Morgan v. Bingham Stage Lines Co. et al. (Dec.
13, 1929), 283 P. 160, 166, 167. Action by plaintiff for
the wrongful death of one Orson Morgan as a result of
the alleged negligence of defendant in operation of one
of its motor buses. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendants
appeal. There was a conflict in the testimony as to
whether or not the motor vehicle driven by defendant
ran into plaintiff ·at a time when he was crossing the
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.

street to n1ount a standing street car. Some of the testimony indicated that the street car was standing, some
that it was moving ·a.t the time of the accident. There
was evidence "~hich the court found authorized submission to the jury of the question of defendant's negligence in failing to operate the vehicle at a proper and
safe speed and in failing to keep a proper lookout. The
court, in reversing and granting a new trial, discussed
the obligation of the trial court to give instructions
covering the theory of both parties to the case in the
following language :
''The court refused to give either of these
requests, and the only instruction with reference
to defendants' theory of contributory negligence
in addition to instruction No. 5-, already quoted,
was instruction No. 12, as follows:
"'You are instructed that contributory
negligence is the failure to use that ordinary
care and diligence that would be expected of
an ordinary prudent person of similar age
and experience to that of the deceased, Orson
Morgan, under like circumstances to avoid
(an injury. Therefore,- even though you find
that the defendants were negligent, still, if
you find that the deceased, Orson Morgan,
did not exercise that ordinary care and diligence to prevent injury to himself that would
be expected of ordinary and prudent persons
of similar age and e~perience situated as
Orson Morgan was, you should find for the
defendants and against the plaintiff, no cause
· of action.'
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''A party is entitled to have his case submitted
to the jury on the theory of his evidence as well
as upon the theory of the whole evidence. Toone
v. 0 'Neill Const. Co., 40 Utah, 265, 121 P. 10;
Hartley v. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah, 121, 124 P.
522, 523, :and Miller v. Utah Consol. M. Co. et al.,
53 Utah, 366, 178 P. 771; Pratt v. Utah Light &
Traction Co., 57 Utah, 7, 169 P. 868.
"The following language of Mr. Justice Straup
in the case of Hartley v. Salt Lake City, supra,
is pecularily applicable here: 'There are two parties to :a lawsuit. Each, on a submis~sion of the
case to the jury, is entitled to a submission of it
on his theory and the law in respect thereof.. The
defendant's theory as to the cause of the accident is embodied in the proposed requests. There
is some evidence, as we have shown, to render·
them applicable to the case. That is not disputed.
We think the court ',s refusal to charge substantially ia.s requested was error. That the ruling
was ~prejudicial and works a reversal of the judgment is self-evident and unavoidable.'
''Respondent's counsel apparently do not contest this rule of law, but they argue these requests
were substantially covered, as the court found
was the ea.se in the cases cited. The court in
other instructions set forth fully plaintiff's theory
of the evidence as to the alleged negligence on the
p~art of the defendants, but, except as pointed out,
gave no instructions on defendants' theory.
''While the requests are not models of accuracy, we think the defendants were entitled to have
at least the substance of the s~ame given so as to
present their theory of the evidence to the jury,
and that a failure on the part of the court to do
so was prejudicial error.
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"By ""hat is here said it is not intended to
hold that, in eYery case w· here a pedestrian at- .
tempts to ~approach a street car, he must either
stop or look or listen for a·pproaching vehicles
and his failure to do so 'vould constitute contributory negligence as a matter ·of law. All
that it is intended to hold is that defendant is
entitled to have his theory of the case presented
to the jury. Briefly, they were entitled to have
the jury told, in substance, that in crossing or
attempting to cross a public street, it was the
duty of the deceased to exercise due care and
reasonable vigilance to discover approaching
vehicles, and that, if the jury should find that as
a matter of fact the deceased f,ailed to do what
due care required by suddenly, without looking,
-stepping out from the curb line between two
parked cars directly into or in front of defendants' car at a time and under such circumstances
that defendants' agent could not, by the exercise
of ordinary care, have avoided the accident they
might find such conducf to be negligence on the
part of the deceased, and, if they further found
that such negligence_ directly contributed to the
accident, then plaintiff could not recover."
In Morrison v. Perry
772, 778, the court stated :

(Aug~

17, 1943), 140 P. (2d)

''Defendant's theory, which w·as supported by
evidence, was that deceased, by driving on his
left-hand side of the highway, and his failure to
turn to his right side in time to avoid creating
an emergency, did create an emergency which
confronted defendant through no fault of his. The
court failed to properly serp~arate the theories of
the parties, but instead gave general instructions
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

42

treating the rights and duties of each d.river as
being mutual, without regard to defenda;nt 's theory as to deceased's negligence in first being on
his w·rong side of the highway.. Defendant is entitled to have his case submitted to the jury on
any theory justified by proper evidence. Morgan
v. Bingham Stage Line Co., 75 Utah 87, 283 P.
· 160; Hartley v. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 121, 124
P. 522; Pratt v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 57
Utah 7, 169 P. 868; Smith v. Lenzi, 74 Utah 362,
279 P. 893; Martineau v. Hanson, 47 Utah 549,
155 P. 432.
"Each party is entitled to have his theory of
the case presented in such a way as to aid the
jury and not confuse it. In Toone v. J.P. O'Neill
Construction Company, 40 Utah 265, 121 P. 10,
16, the Court suggests the better practice of presenting the p·arties' theories of the case to the
jury; 'One way the court might have followed
in charging the jury would have been to charge
them in separate instructions, first, in accordance
with respondent's evidence; and, second, in accordance with appellant's evidence which related
to the •proposition covered by the instruction in
question, and in each instruction have directed
the jury to return a verdict in accordance with
their findings upon that question.'
·
''The court should have given some of the defendant's requested instructions pertaining to
his theory of the case. The defendant submitted
49 requests for instructions, some of which were
admittedly repetitious. Such a method of submitting requests for instructions does not aid
the trial court in preparing the charge to the jury.
We eall attention to the fact that defendant in
his brief took time and effort to point out errors
in instructions to which he took no exceptions.''
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The case of j_~IcDonald v. Unio·n Pacific R. Co., (Apr.
5, 1946), 167 P. (2d) 685, 686, 'vas an action under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act for damages caused
by the alleged negligence of the defendant in failing to
furnish pJ·aintiff a reasonably safe place to vvork. From
judgment plaintiff appeals, citing as error the refusal
of the trial court to grant instructions covering plaintiff's theory of the case. The appellate court found
that the trial court had granted instructions covering
plaintiff's theory of the case in other instructions. However, the court affirmed the general rule applicable
in the following language :
''Appellant has discussed his errors covering
the lower court's refusal to give the requested
instructions as a group. The substance of his
objection is that, by such refusal,_ the lower court
failed to submit to the jury appellant's theory
of his case. There is no question that app·ellant
is entitled to have his theory of the case submitted
to the jury - that need not be argued. Pratt v.
Utah Light & Traction Co., 57 Utah 7, 169 P.
868; Morgan v. Bingham Stage Lines C·o., 75
Utah 87, 283 P. 160. But did the court fail in
this respect ~ ''
All of the foregoing authorities support plaintiff's
contention with respect to the court's refusal to grant
and give ·plaintiff's Requests No. 4 and No. 5. Pl,aintiff 's
Requested Instructions No. 4 and No. 5 are correct
statements of the law as applied to the evidence in this
case, in an affirmative manner ·setting forth plaintiff's
theory of recovery. In all fairness plaintiff was enSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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titled to these instructions and at no other place in the
instructions does plaintiff's theory of recovery appear.
We feel certain that the grave miscarriage of justice
demons'trated by the jury's verdict was caused, in part
a.t least, by the error herein complained of and that
therefore this error was grossly prejudicial to plaintiff.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AT THE SECOND TRIAL IN INSTRUCTION NO. 10 WHEN IT INSTRUCTED THE
JURY THAT "* * * the mere happening of the acc·ident to plaintiff is no P'roof of negligence on the part
of either the plaintiff or defendant or evidence of same."
(Statement of Points 4).
By . this instruction all of the pertinent facts supported by, the testimony upon which plaintiff relied as
establishing the negligence of defendant, and which
stand uncontradicted, are withdrawn from jury consideration. The happ~ening of the accident involved the
fact that plaintiff slipped ·On the ice over the ties while
engaged in the performance of his duties as a switch
tender. The fact that he slipped was of important probative value in determining the ultimate question of
whether or not his place of work was unsafe because
slippery. The instruction of the court told the jury that
the haippening of the accident, that is, plain tiff slipping
on the ice over the ties, was rio evidence of negligence.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

45
The happening of the accident \Yas the very essence of
plaintiff's case. The law on this point is clearly declared and stated in 38 Am. Jur. beginning at the top
of ·page 985 in the following language:
"While it is true that simply because an accident has occurred, negligence is not to be presumed, still, in determining the question of negligence, the fact that an accident has occurred may
be and should be taken into consideration, in connection with all other facts and circumstances of
the case, for the purpose of determining whether
in fact there was negligence. Negligence may be
inferred from circumstances surrounding the injury, if not from the fact of the injury itself.''
In the footnote at page 985 of 38 American Jurisprudence appears the following supported statement:
''No general rule can be laid down that the
mere occurrence- .of an accident is or is not sufficient prima facie proof of actionable negligence.
* * * Griffin v. Boston & A. R. Co., 148 Mass.
143, 19 N. E. 166, 1 L.R.A. 698, 12 Am. St. Re·p.
526.
''Negligence, like any other fact, may be inferred from th·e circumstances, ·and the case may
be such that though there be no positive proof
that the defendant has been guilty of any neglect
of duty, the inference -of negligence would be irresistible. Barnowsky v. Helson, 89 Mich. 523,
50 N. W. 989, 15 L.R.A. 33. ''
The Sup·reme Court -of Utah has without doubt
recognized this fundamental and controlling proposition.
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See Lewis v. Davis, 201 Pac. 861, 864, wherein the court
stated:
"At the close of plaintiffs' evidence defendant moved for a nonsuit, and when all of the
evidence was submitted moved for a directed
verdict. Both motions were denied. Defendant
excepted to both rulings of the court and argues
the exceptions together. The grounds assigned
for the motion are (1) Failure to prove defendant's negligence at all; (2) failure to show that
defendant permitted gas to leak; (3) the evidence shows that deceased was guilty of contributory negligence; (4) the injury, if caused
by failure to properly care for the generator,
was due to the negligence of fellow servants;
( 5) the evidence fails to show the proximate
cause of the injury ; ( 6) the deceased assumed
the risk. The gist of defendant's contention in
support of this .assignment seems to be that there
is no definite proof of any specific act or omission on the part of defendant constituting negligence which was the •proximate cause of the injury.
"It is true that no one saw the accident happen. No one knew just what Mr. Lewis was doing
·when the explosion occurred. No one testified
that the generator leaked gas, or that the hose
was disconnected, thereby permitting gas to
escape. No one saw water and carbide in the
tank, or noticed the condition of the float. No
one ·saw the generator so as to see whether it
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had been taken apart, or whether the p·arts were
in place, each performing its function in the generation of gas. No one knows the immediate cause
of the explosion, or just how Mr. Lewis came
to his death.
''The above propositions, in substance, constitute the basis upon which defendant relies in
support of th·e contention that the court erred in
denying its motion for nonsuit and directed verdict. ·
' ' (2) In the opinion of the court, under the
evidence in the record, the fact that an explosion
actually occurred is an answer to practically
every proposition abov·e set forth. If there had
been no water and no carbide in the generator
under pressure by means of a float on top and
no gas leaking or hose disconnected by which
gas could escape and no contact b·etween the gas
and a lighted torch or other fire there could have
been no explosion, and if there had been no explosion Robert Lewis would not have been killed
in the manner shown by the evidence. ' '
Plaintiff charged defendant with neglect in failing
to furnish him ·a safe place to work. The slipping and
falling on the switch ties, under the authorities revealed
here, was proper proof -of this allegation, yet this event
and occurrence was removed from jury consideration
by Instruction No. 10 given upon defendant's request.
In the Lewis v. Davis case the happening of the accident
and the facts surrounding it were found to he entirely
sufficient to support the verdict of the jury favorable
to the plaintiff.
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The position of plaintiff is well stated in the case of
Orris v. Chicago, R.I.&; P. Ry .. Co. (Mo.), 214 S.W.125,

as:

''I. The plaintiff says that there V\Tas error
<:ommitted by the court in giving for defendant
its instruction No. 1, which reads:
" 'The court instructs you that the mere fact
that plain tiff was injured while employed by defendant, and the fact that he has sued to recover
damages therefor, are of themselves no evidence
"·hatever of the defendant's negligence or liability
in this case, and there can be no recovery by the
plain tiff in this case, unless the plaintiff has, by
a preponderance of the credible evidence in the
case, established negligence on the part of the defendant, as described in other instructions herein.'
'' \\T e think this instruction misleading and
harmful in this case. Let us shorten the instruc-tion so that its view may more fully appear. Thus
shortened, it reads:
'' ' The court instructs you that the mere
fact that plaintiff was injured while employed
by defendant * * * is of itself no evidence
whatever of the defendant's negligence or liability in this case, and there can be no rec~ve~y
by the plaintiff in this case unless th¥ pla1ntl~
has, by a preponderance of the cr~ed1table eVIdence in the case established negligence on the
part of the defendant, as described in other Instructions herein.'
'

0

''From this instruction the jury could well

dra~ ~he conclusion that they should not consid~r

the InJury to plaintiff in determining the matter
of defendal!-t 's n~egligence. They could well draw
the conclus1on that they should not consider the
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character of injury to plaintiff in determining the
matter of defendant's negligence. They could
"~en conclude that 'the creditable evidence' used
in the latter part of the instruction meant evidence other than evidence as to the injury and
the character of the injury. In this particular
case the character of the injury is a material link
in the chain of circumstances tending to sho'v
negligenee. To make the matter clearer some additional facts in evidence should be stated. Thertis evidence tending to show that when the netting
is in proper shape only small cinders escape
through the smokestack, and that aft·er night
they would look to be alive, and 'just a minute
and they were out; they were fine cinders.' The
evidence also shows that with some flues not
working the suction through the others is greater,
and this tends to throw the cinders out of the
smokestack with more force and velocity. In addition the plaintiff says this particular cinder
burned his eye, indicating heat and size.
''So taking all the facts, the ·very character
of the injury would be a link in the chain of circumstances tending to rprove a defective spark
arrester, or negligence. The eye being burned indicates heat in the cinder as well as size. The
small cinders lose their heat more rapidly upon
exposure to the air. The large cinder carries its
heat or burning power longer arid further. So the
character of the injury in a case like this tends
to show a larger cinder, and a larger cinder
tends to show a defective spark arrester. In
eases like this the jury should consider the injury and its character in an eff·ort to determine
negligenee. This instruction, in our judgment, is
misleading upon this matter. It is true that the
mere fact of injury, standing alone, is no proof
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of negligence. In Blanton v. Dold, 109 Mo. loc. cit.
74, 18 S.W. 1151, this court said:
'' 'The mere fact of an injury to plaintiff
does not necessarily create a liability or warrant an inference of defendants' negligence.
The burden of proof was on plaintiff to establish directly or by just inference, some want of
care to which his injury might fairly and
reasonably be traced.,.
'' There is a line of cases to like effect. But
these cases do not conflict with the views we have
expressed in this case. These cases do not say
that the character of the injury inflicted may not
be a circumstance tending to show negligence, or
a fact from which, when coup·led with other facts,
negligence may not be inferred.
''Instruction No. 1 says that the mere fact that
'Plaintiff was injured is no evidence whatever of
def.endan t 's negligence. This naturally led the
jury to believe that they should not consider the
injury in determining negligence in this case. We
think the instruction wrong and so rule. The instruction, under the peculiar facts of this case, is
but little better than the instruction so forcefully
condemned by Brown, C., in Myers v. City of
Independence, 189 S. W. loc. cit. 823. After setting out the instruction, our learned commissioner
commented thus:
'' 'This instruction illustrates that masterly
use of language by which even experts are
puzzled, and juries wait with patience for such
explanation as their author can give of the
meaning of the terms he has used. It tells them
that unless he has proven his case by the greater
weight of the testimony they must disregard
the fact that he received injuries. In a case in
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\Yhich, uccurd.iug to all authority, the fact that
he received injuries cuts so large an evidential
figure, it is important that the jury should be
plainly instructed whether he must prove his ,
case by the greater weight of evidence before
the jury could take into consideration the fact
that he was injured, or whether the fact that he
" . .as injured by the turning of the current of
electricity through his body might he taken
into consideration in proving 'his case' is not
explained. A careful reading of this instruction impresses us that the words we have italicized have no logical or grammatical office in
it, other than that which lies in the W ebsterian
definition of the word 'injury' as 'an act which
damages, harms, or hurts,' or its legal definition, 'an actionable wrong.' In a case of this
character, where so much depends upon the deduction of fact to be drawn from the occurrence
of the injury, the vice of such an instruction is
especially manifest.'

''So we say of this instruction. It is misleading to the utmost. From it the jury could readily
conclude that in determining negligence or liability they should entirely exclude the injury and its
peculiar character.
"In Walker v. Railroad, 178 S. W. loc. cit.
109, we had before us this instruction:
'' 'The mere fact, if it be a fact, that plaintiff was injured does not entitle her to recover
in this case, and you should not allow such fact
to influence you in arriving at your verdict.'
"In that case, like this, the jury had found
for the defendant. The foregoing instruction had
been given for the defendant. Of this instruction
we said:
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'' 'The court instructed the jury at the instance of defendant that they should not allow
the fact that the plaintiff was injured to influence them in arriving at their verdict. While
we understand that the fact of injury is not
alone sufficient to authorize a recovery on the
ground of negligence, we do not understand
how it is possible for the jury to remain uninfluenced by the existence of a fact the existence
or nonexistence of which is the ultimate subject
of their inquiry. The fact that plaintiff was permitted to fall to the ground is the negligence
charged. Negligence is predicated upon the
fact, which the jury must find, that the fall is
liable to injure her, and they must also find
that the injury was the immediate result of
letting her fall. There is a refinement somewhere in this instruction which we are unable
to grasp, and we think that is sufficient reason
for withholding the task from the jury.'
''So we say in this case. The task of grasping
defendant's instruction No. 1 should have been
withheld from the jury.''
In Southern Ry. Co. v. Smith (Ala.), 221 Ala. 273,
128 S. 228, 230, the trial court refused to give the following instructions requested by the defendant:

"7. 'The court charges the jury that the fact,
if it be a fact, that the plaintiff was thrown or
caused to fall by the sudden movement or jerking
of the cars is not evidence of negligence.,.
· '' 8. 'The court charges the jury that the mere
fact that the p~laintiff was thrown or caused to
fall from the cars to the ground and sustained
the injuries complained of, is not sufficient to
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authorize the jury to find that the defendant's
engineer was guilty of any negligence proximately
causing the iJ>laintiff's injuries.' ''
The Appellate Court held that these requests were
properly refused, and stated:
''We do not think the particular attitude of
plaintiff on top of the car, as a matter of law,
prevents an application of the rule there stated,
that the fact that he fell off the train, in conse-quence of a jerk, is some evidence that the jerk
was unusually or negligently severe, unless the
jury should find that his attitude was such as that
an ordinarily careful jerk would have caused him
to fall as he did. In view of the fact that the
jury could find that an ordinary jerk would not
have caused plaintiff thus to fall, we cannot say
as a matter of law in this case that a fall caused
by the jerk was not some evidence of negligence.
To say so would invade the province of the jury.
It will be observed that, the jury was not instructed that in this case the fall, occasioned by
a jerk, was some evidence that it was unusual or
negligent. That would likewise have been invasive of the province of the jury as applied to the
facts and contentions in this case.''
The error herein complained of becomes more manifest when viewed in relation to the Court's Instruction
No. 11, herein set forth :
''The jury is instructed that it cannot, in the
performance of its duty as jurors, reach a verdict
for the p·laintiff in this case if, in order to do so,
it is necessary to rest its verdict upon mere conjecture and speculation. Before finding a verdict
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for the ~plaintiff the jury must believe, from a
preponderance of the evidence and as a fair inference from the evidence adduced, that the
plain tiff was injured by reason of the alleged act
of negligence set forth in Instruction No. 9 and
heretofore mentioned.''
By Instructions Nos. 10 and 11 the jury was told that
the mere happening of the accide~t was no proof of
n·egligence nor evidence of same and that they could not
base a finding upon mere conjecture and speculation.
No distinction was made between . mere conjecture and
speculation, and permissible inferences allowable from
the £act plain tiff slip.ped and was injured.
In Lavender v. K urn, et al., 327 U.S. 645, 66 S. Ct.
740, 743, the Supreme Court of the United States declared:

-''It is no answer to say that the jury's verdict
involved speculation and conjecture. Whenever
facts are in dispute or the evidence is such that
fair-minded men may draw different inferences,
a measure of speculation and conjecture is required on the part of those whose duty it is to
settle the dispute by choosing what seems to them
to be the most reasonable inference. Only when
there is a complete absence of probative facts to
support the conclusion reached does a reversible
error appear. But where, as here, there is an
·evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict, the jury
is free to discard or disbelieve whatever facts
are inconsistent with its conclusion. And the apiJ>·ellate court's function is exhausted when that
evidentiary basis becomes apparent, it being immaterial that the court might draw a contrary
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inference or feel that another conclusion is more
reasonable. ''
In the case at bar the fact that an accident occurred
was a most important fact in the determination of
whether or not defendant was negligent. The event
consisted of Williams slipping on the switch ties. From
the fact that he slipped, the permissible inference could
be drawn that there was a slipp;ery, unsafe condition
which caused him to fall, and the consideration of that
factor, together with the other circumstances in the
case, might well have led a properly instructed jury
to conclude that negligence existed. But the jury was
not permitted to consider Williams' slipping in reaching
its determination of the'" existence or nonexistence of
negligence nor to draw any inferences therefrom. Such
limitation on the jury deprived plaintiff of substantial
rights. That this error occurred in an instruction which.
the court intended as the inst.ruction containing (Plaintiff's
theory of the case makes the error much more manifest.
In other words, the jury is directed to Instruction No. 10
as containing plaintiff's theory of the case and in that
instruction is confronted with the erroneous legal prin;_
ciple that the mere happening of the accident is no proof
of negligence on the p.art of defendant or evidence of
same.
We submit that the gross error contained in Instruction No. 10 was most prejudicial, and in and of itself
requires reversal.
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POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT, AT THE SECOND TRIAL,
BY GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 12., HAS REVIVED
THE DOCTRINE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A COMPLETE BAR TO RECOVERY BY
PLAINTIFF (Statement of Points 6).
Instruction No. 12 is herein set forth for the convenience of the court :
''The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was negligent and that such negligence was a
proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff. To
establish the defense of ·contributory negligence
the burden is upon the defendant to prove, by a
preponderance of evidence, that the ·plaintiff was
negligent and that such negligence contributed in
some degree as a proximate cause of the injury.''
(R. 064).
It is readily apparent from a cursory reading
of the instruction that the trial court misconceived the
roll of contributory negligence under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Where the concept of multiplicity
of causes and apportionment of damages is recognized,
contributory negligence can never he considered as a
defense. Webster's Dictionary defines defense -as, ''An
opposing or denial of the truth or validity of the plaintiff's case.'' Contributory negligence is only material
as bearing on the issue of damages.
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45

United States Code ..:lnnotated, Section 53, reads

as follows:
''In all actions hereafter brought against any
such comn1on carrier by railroad under or by
virtue of any of the ·provisions of this chapter to
recover damages for personal injuries to an employee, or where such injuries have resulted in
his death, the fact that the employee may have
been guilty of contributory negligence shall not
bar a recovery, but the damages .shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of
neglig·ence attributable to such employee: P~Q
vided, That no such employee who may be injured
or killed shall be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence in any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to
the injury or death of such employee.''
Instruction No. 12 is a stock instruction applicable
to common law negligence actions but wholly erroneous
in an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
Instruction No. 21, which pertains to assessment of
damages, does not correct the error contained in Instruction No. 12.
In 64 C. J., Sec. 600, it is stated:
"It is proper to refuse, and error to give conflicting and contradictory instructions, since a
charge containing two distinct propositions conflicting with each other tends so to confuse the
jury as to prevent their rendition of an intelligent
verdict, the jury cannot be required to determine
what part of a contradictory charge is correct,
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or left to reconcile conflicting ·principles of law;
it ordinarily cannot be determined from the verdict which rule was adopted by the jury, the court
is left in doubt and uncertainty as to the facts
actually found by the jury as a basis for its verdict, and where instructions are inconsistent with,
or contradict, each other, it is usually impossible
to say whether the jury were controlled by the
one or the other.''
Courts have held under many and varied circumstances that giving of conflicting instructions constitutes
reversible error.
In Atlantic Co. et al. v. Roberts, 179 Va. 669, 20 S. E.
2d 520, it appeared that the fact situation warranted an
instruction on unavoidable accident. One of the instructions was to the ·effect that if ·plaintiff was free fron1
fault the jury could find the issues in favor of plaintiff
and against the defendant. The court held that the
giving of the instruction under the facts of this particular
case without qualifying it by setting forth the unavoidable accident situation was reversible error. The Court
stated:
''Instruction No. 3 is erroneous in that it
makes no reference to an unavoidable accident,
but would allow recovery if the jury simply
found the plaintiff free of fault. This instruction
is thus in conflict with and vitiates instruction
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'G', given on behalf of the defendants, which is
in the follo\Ying language :
" 'The court instructs the jury that if you
believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was
injured ~s a result of an unavoidable accident,
then your verdict must be for the· defendant.' ''

In Kuether v. Kansas City Light & Power Co. (Mo.),
276 S. ''1 • 105, 109, the court held that instructing the
jury in a situation where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
·was properly applicable that they had no right to presume negligence if the evidence did not preponderate

in favor of the plaintiff, would have been reversible
error. The Court stated:
''Defendant directs anothe-r charge of error
against the action of the court in refusing defendant's proffered instruction D5, where it was
sought to tell the jury that they have 'no right to
presume negligence, and, if the evidence does not
i)reponderate in favor of plaintiff, then your verdict should be for the defendant.' This is contradictory of, and in conflict with, plaintiff's instructions 1 and 2, which we hoi~ properly included the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The
instruction of defendant was prop~erly refused.''
See also Oettinger v. Stewart (Cal. 1943), 137 P. 2d 852.
In Thomas v., Stott (Mo.), 114 S. W. 2d 142, 144, the
court found that there was a fact situation in which the
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jury could find that plaintiff's negligence was the sole
negligence in the case and held that instructing the jury
that contributory negligence does not defeat recovery

under the humanitarian doctrine without also instructing
that the sole negligence of the plaintiff would defeat recovery was error. The Court stated:
"While contributory negligence does not defeat recovery under the humanitarian doctrine,
still the doctrine is now well established that sole
negligence of plaintiff may defeat recovery. It
follows that if there be substantial evidence that
a plaintiff's injury be caused by plaintiff's sole
negligence, then defendant is entitled to an instruction submitting the question of sole negligence of plaintiff. Borgestede v. W aldbauer, 337
Mo. 1205, 88 S. W. 2d 373. We conclude that the
evidence given by the defendant in this case justifies the giving of instruction F.
''As to instruction No. 1, the same conforms
in substance to instructions that have been approved. However, as the question of sole negligence is involved in this case, we conclude that
the instruction presents reversible error in that
it permits the jury to find for ·plaintiff regardless of the fact of whether or not her negligence
was the sole cause of her injury. Instruction No.
1, we conclude, is in error, also, for the reason
that it is in conflict with a proper instruction
given on behalf of defendant."
Other cases where it has been held that instructions
were conflicting and therefore prejudicial are hereil1
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cited for the convenience of the court: W estbe.rg v.
Willde (Cal.), 85 P. 2d 507; Morrison v. Perry (Utah),
(1943), 140 P. 2d 772; Alcamisi v. Market St. Ry .. Co., 67
Cal. App. 710, 228 P. 410; Hageman v. Arnold (Mont.),
254 P. 1070; Skelton v .. Great Northern Ry. Co., (Mont.),
100 P. 2d 929.
We recognize the doctrine that the instructions as
given by the court are to be considered and read as a
whole. However, w·here two instructions are apparently
conflicting and are not related one to the other by reference, as in the ease at bar, it can never be determined
which instruction was followed by the jury, and although
one of said instructions is correct, that in no way excuses the error contained in the other. Here the jury
is referred to ''the defense of contributory negligence,''
and that if the palintiff was negligent and such negligence contributed as a- cause of his injures the defense
of contributory negligence is available to the defendant>
Such instruction in a Federal Employers' Liability Act
case is confusing and misleading especially where at no
place in the instructions is the jury told that contributory
negligence is not a defense, but can only be considered
in mitigation of damages.

POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT, AT THE SECOND TRIAL,
BY GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 19, PLACED AN
UNWARRANTED BURDEN OF PROOF UPON TH:BJ
SHOULDERS OF PLAINTIFF AND IN EFFECT
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REVIVED THE DOCTRINES OF CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK AS
COMPLETE BARS TO RECOVERY BY PLAINTIFF
(Statement of Points 7).
For convenience of the court, Instruction No. 19 is
set forth herein :
''INSTRUCTION NO. 19
''You are instructed that where an employee
has two ways of performing an act in the course
of his employment, the one safe and the other
dangerous, the employee owes a duty to exercise
reasonable and ordinary care to discover and use
the safe way of performing such duty. Therefore,
if you find that the plaintiff could have manipulated said switch while standing on cinders and
gravel and that such a position was reasonably
safe and the plaintiff by the exercise of reasonable
and ordinary care would have discovered such
safe way of operating the switch, but nevertheless
chose a position on the ties which he as a reasonable and prudent switchman should have known
were slippery :and dangerous, then the plaintiff
would be guilty of negligence, an·d if such negligence was the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, then your verdict must be for the
defendant, no cause for action.-''
The character of the duty which plaintiff owed is
clearly confused in Instruction No. 19. Plaintiff owed no
duty of exercising reasonable and ordinary care to discover and use a safe way of throwing the switch even
assuming that there was a safe and a dangerous waJJ
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available to h.-im. He simply owed the duty of conducting
hinl,Self as a reasonably prudent pe.rson under the circumstances. If he negligently cho·se a dangerous way
when a safe way 'vere available to him, that could amount
to nothing more than contributory negligence on his
part and the question remaining for the jury's consideration is whether or not the place was unsafe and whether
or not the railroad company neglected its duty in failing
to furnish him with a reasonably safe place in which to
work. The duty imposed upon plaintiff by the instruction
was therefore a greater and different duty than that
imposed by the Federal Employ~rs' Liability Act.

In Boston & M.R.R. v. Cabana, 148 F. 2d 150, 152,
the court stated :

"The defendant contends that it was under
no duty to light the area near the door at the
back of the engine house where the p·laintiff's
work did not require him to go. Such an argument
may prove too much since if the plaintiff had
been working near the rear wheels the short
route to the other side would have been the one
he actually followed. On the facts here, however,
he took the longer way around, and the reasonableness of that is for the jury. At the most it
has to do with contributory negligence on his·
part, and under the Act contributory negligence
is not a defense and goes merely to the mitigation of damages.''
We conceive the correct rule of law to be set forth
in Brady v .. Flo.rence & C. 'C. R. Co., 44 Colo. 283, 98 P.
321, 323, wherein it is stated that even though one manner
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of performing a task h; n1ore dangerous than another,
the plaintiff is not guilty of neglect in choosing the
more dangerous method if in doing so he does not di ~
obey instructions or rules, acts in good faith and the
method chosen might have been adopted under like
circumstances by a reasonable and prudent man. We
quote from the case as follows:

'' * * * But it is insisted that Brady was negligent in regard to the method employed by him
for performing this duty. Such negligence consisting in uncoupling the air brake from the inside, instead of from the outside of the curve
upon which train No. 37 was standing. In other
words, that Brady chose the more dangerous of
two methods for performing his duty, and hence
assumed all the risk involved in so doing. Touching the ·proposition of law thus invoked, we suggest in passing that the choice does not establish
contributory negligence, if in so doing he does
not disobey instructions or rules, acts in good
faith, and the method chosen might have been
adopted under like circumstances by a reasonable and prudent man.''
And in the recent case of Wilkerson v. Mc~Carthy et
al., 336 U. S. 53, 69 S. Ct. 413, 417, reversing the Utah
Supreme Court 187 P. 2d 188, t,he United States Supreme
Court supported the proposition herein contended for in
the following language:

..
''There was, as the state court pointed out,
evidence to show that p~etitioner could have taken
a slightly longer route and walked around the
pit, thus avoiding the use of the board. This
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fact, ho\Yever, under the ter1ns of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, would not completely
immunize the respondents from liability if the
injury was 'in part' the result of respondents'
negligence. For while petitioner's failure to use
a safer method of crossing might be found by the
jury to be contributory negligence, the Act provides that 'contributory negligence shall not bar
a recovery, but the damages shall he diminished
by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee * * *.' ''
It will be noted that the court places the burden on
plaintiff of discovering at his peril, the safer or less
dangerous of two available "\vays of ·performing a duty·.
That duty has never been pronounced as an affirmative
duty on the part of plaintiff. Plaintiff's only duty is
to exercise that degree of care of an ordinary prudent
person under the circumstances. If plaintiff w·ere negligent under the evidence in this case he could have only
been negligent because he failed to discover a more
safe way available to him. There is absolutely no evidence from which a jury could find that plaintiff at any
time actually discovered the unsafe condition which resulted in his injury. It was dark, and he was in a hurry.
He said he did not know the switch ties were slick and
slippery until he slip.ped and fell. If the jury, under the
court's instruction, found that plaintiff was negligent in
failing to discover a safe way of performing his work,
they were invited by the court's instruction to find also
that this failure was the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. Plaintiff could only be negligent if the
place he chose for working was unsafe. If the place of
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work was unsafe the defendant must, under the law,
be charged with violation of its duty toward plaintiff,
and if the jury is invited under those circumstances to
find that plaintiff's negligence was the sole proximate
cause of his injury, the court ~s reviving the doctrine of
assumption of risk and is saying to the jury, ''If plaintiff should have discovered the unsafe place of work
but didn't, and is injured thereby, he assumed the risks
associated with the unsafe condition.'' Our Federal Congress has eliminated the defense of assumption of risk
in the following language, 45 U.s:. C. A.., Section 54:
''Section 54. Assumption of risks of employment.
''That in any action brought against any common carrier under or by virtue of any of the
provisions of this chapter to recover damages
for injuries to, or the death of, any of its employees, such employees shall not be held to have
assumed the risks of his employment in any case
where such injury or death resulted in whole or
in part from the negligence of any of the officers,
agents, or employees of such carrier; and no
employee shall be held to have assumed the risks
of his employment in any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to
the injury or death of such employee. Apr. 22,
1908, c. 149, Sec. 4, 35 Stat. 66; Aug. 11, 1939,
c. 685, Sec. 1, 53 Stat. 1404."
In the case of Tille.r v . Atlantic ·Coast Line R. Co.,
318 U.S. 54, 87 L. Ed. 610, 63 S.·Ct. 444, 446, it appeared
that a railroad policeman was inspecting seals on cars of
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a train moving slo,vly on one track 'vhen he 'Yas killed
by the rear car of a train backing in an opposite dire c. · tion on another track. The rear of the train which killed
the policeman 'vas unlighted, although a brakeman with
a lantern 'vas riding on the back step on the side away
from the ·policeman and the bell was ringing on the
engine but no special signal of warning was given. The
trial court granted a directed verdict against plaintiff
which was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals,
{128 F. . (2d)420), whereupon plaintiff was granted a writ
of certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States
and the case was reversed, the court holding that questions of negligence and contributory negligence should
have been submitted to the jury. The negligence claimed
by plaintiff was in failure of the defendant to furnish
plaintiff a reasonably safe place to work. The court
stated:
''The Circuit Court distinguished he tween
assumption of risk as a defense by employers
against the consequence of their own negligence,
and assumption of risk as negating any conclusion that negligence existed at all. The court
reasoned that if, for example, the respondent had
negligently failed to provide a workman with a
sound tool, and he was thereby injured, it could
not under the amendment claim that he had
assumed the risk of using the defective imp.Iement;
but that if a workman were injured in the ordinary course of his work, as in such a switching
operation as this, the assumption of risk might still
be relied upon to prove that the resipondent had
no duty to protect him from accustomed danger.
The court rejected petitioner's argument that
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since the doctrine of assumption of risk had been
abolished 'the carrier can no longer interpose it
as a shield against the consequences of its neglect
and hence is liable for injuries to its employees
in its railroad yards or elsewhere, unless it takes
precautions for their safety commensurate with
the danger that they are likely to encounter.'
In rejecting this argument the court below put
the core of its decision in these words: 'The con·clusion is inescapable that Congress did not intend
to enlarge the obligation of carriers to look out
for the safety of their men when exposed to the
ordinary risks of the business, and that in circumstances other than those provided for in the
amended section of the statute, the doctrine of
the assumption of the risk must be given its
accustomed weight.'
''We find it unnecessary to consider whether
there is any merit in such a conceptual distinction between asipects of assumption of risk which
seem functionally so identical, and hence we need
not pause over the cases cited by the court below,
all decided before the 1939 amendment, which
treat assumption of risk sometimes as a defense
to negligence, sometimes as the equivalent to
non-negligence. We hold that every vestige of
the doctrine of assumption of risk was obliterated
from the law by the 1939 amendment, and that
Congre.ss, by abolishing the defense of assumption
of risk in that statute, did not mean to leave
op,en the identical defense for the master by
changing its name to 'non-negligence'. As this
Court said in facing the ·hazy margin between
negligence and assumption of risk as involved
in the Safety Appliance Act of 1893, 45 U.S.C.A.
Sec. 1 et seq., 'Unless great care be taken, the
servant's rights will be sacrificed by simply
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charging him with assumption of the risk under
another name ; ' and no such result can be permitted here.
"Perhaps the nature of the present ·problem
can best be seen against the background of one
hundred years of master-servant tort doctrine.
Assumption of risk is a judicially created rule
which was developed in response to the general
impulse of common law courts at the beginning
of this period to insulate the employer as much
as possible from bearing the 'human overhead'
which is an inevitable part of the cost-to someone
-of the doing of industrialized business. The
general purpose behind this development in the
common law seems to have been to give maximum
freedom to expanding industry. The assumption
of risk doctrine for example was attributed by
this Court to 'a rule of public policy, inasmuch
as an opposite doctrine would not only subject
employers to considerable and often ruinous responsibilities, thereby embarrassing all branches
of business,' but would also encourage carelessness on the part of the employee. In the pursuit
of its general objective the common law took many
forms and developed many doctrines. One ~of the
first was the fellow serv&nt-assumption of risk
rule which originated in Priestly v. Fowler. In
Priestly v. Fowler, the Court said, 'The servant
is not bound to risk his safety in the service of
his master, and may, if he thinks fit, decline any
service in which he reasonably apprehends injury
to himself: and in most of the cases in which
danger may be incurred, if not in all, he is just
as likely to be acquainted with the probability
and extent of it as the master.'
''As English courts lived with the assumption
of risk doctrine they discovered that the theory
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they had created -had become morally unacceptable but of such legal force that it could not be
repudiated. The English sought to eliminate the
fellow servant rule, which placed the burden of
an employee's negligence as it affected another
employee on the injured person rather than o~ the
business enterprise, by the employers' Liability
Act of 1880 and found that the assumption of risk
doctrine still left the employee in a hopelessly
unprotected position. In the leading case of
Thomas v. Quartermaine, 1887, 18 Q.B.D. 685, the
court held that an employee standing on a three
foot runway between two unfenced vats who was
attempting to dislodge a piece of wood from one
of the vats and who by accident fell into the other
and was scalded was barred from recovery. Since
he had long known of the possible dangers of the
narrow p1assage he w:as held to _hav-e assumed the
risk of his position. In 1897 the English finally
abandoned the common law remedy altogether as
a protection for injured employees and adopted
a workman's compensation law. '60 & Viet. c. 37."
It is observed that in the old English case, cited by
the court, it was held that since plaintiff had long known
of the possible dangers of the narrow passage he assumed the risk of his position. That was the typical
case of assumption of risk which the court held that the
1939 amendment was designed to forever erase from the
law as it pertains to railroad employee'S under the F.E.
L.A. The court said :
''The doctrine of assump~tion of risk cannot
be 'abolished in toto' and still remain in partial
existence as the court below suggests. The theory
that a servant is completely barred from recovery
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for injury re·sulting from his master's negligence,
which legislatu.res have sought to eliminate in all
·its variou,s forms of contributory negligence, the
fellow servant rule, and assumption of risk, must
not, contrary to the will of Congress, be allowed
recrudescence under any other label in the common law lexieon • • *. ''
This court disregarded the Tiller case and in effect
accepted the old Thomas v. Quartermaine case and the
doctrine of assumption of risk as its authority, when
it invited the jury to find that the place where plaintiff
was working was unsafe and at the same time to find
that plaintiff's failure to discover that unsafe condition _
was the sole proximate cause of his injuries.
The sole question which was of importance to this
jury was whether the place where plaintiff was injured
was a place for men to -work and whether the unsafe
condition contributed, in whole or in part, to the injuries
he sustained.
It will be noted that throughout the instructions
the jury, under given circumstances, are invited to find
that contributory negligence on the part of ·plaintiff was
the sole ·proximate cause of his injuries. Instruction No.
17 states:

'' * * * or that the proximate cause of his injuries was due to his own negligence without
negligence on the part of the defendant proximately contributing to his injury, then your verdict must be for the defendant.''
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Instruction No. 18 also contains the same proposition:

'' * * * if you further believe from the evidence
that such negligence on his part was the sole
proximate cause of ~plaintiff's injuries, then * * *
it is your duty to find the issues against the
plaintiff * * * ''
In Instruction No. 19 the same proposition appears.

'' * * * then the plaintiff would be guilty

or

negligence, and if such negligence was the sole
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, then
your verdict must be for the defendant, * * * ''

Permeating the whole of the instructions is the erroneous proposition that the jury could at one and the
same time find plaintiff guilty of negligence in failing to
discover an unsafe place to work, and also that such
negligence was the sole proximate cause of his injury.
This constitutes revival, in full regalia, of the ancient
and yicious doctrine of assumption of risk which our
Federal Congress has endeavored to eradicate from the
field of F.E.L.A. law.

POINT VI
THE JURY'S VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO IMPORTANT UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE TRIAL.
Plaintiff's right of recovery is based upon the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, which affords remedy
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in all cases 'vhere the injury of an employee is caused,
either in whole or in part, by negligence of the carrier.
The specific act of neg~ligence relied on by the plain tiff is
that defendant, by and through its authorized agents,
servants and employees, knew, or in the .exercise of ordinary care should have known, that the 'veather was at
freezing point and that slush and sno\v around the
switch where plaintiff was injured would be frozen and
would render footing dangerous and unsafe and that
defendant failed and neglected to make said footing
reasonably safe by cleaning the ice and snow off the
place where switch tenders would, in the ordinary performance of their duties, be required to stand, move
or walk, and that said negligent conduct proximately
caused, in whole or in part, the injuries to plaintiff.
The uncontroverted evidence p·resented at the trial
is that plaintiff was injured at approximately 7:10 a.ni.
on the 9th day of December, 1946. The last precipitation
in the area where the accident occurred had ended at ap-proximately 12 :45 p.m. on the 8th day of December,

1946. This precipitation consisted of snow and sleet..
It was Sunday and the precipitation was heavy enough
that workmen were called out specially to clean switch
points and areas around switch stands and had worked
from noon until 6 p.m. on the 8th day of Deeember, 1946;
the temperature had gone down to freezing. Thereafter,
during the course -of the night, it had hovered near freezing. Plaintiff was injured while it was still dark. Workmen were still required to use their lanterns in the perSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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formance of their duties. The plaintiff ha~ only been
working ten minutes. During that time he had been exceedingly busy, having thrown four switches. A ·passenger train was standing on the westbound track waiting until he had thrown the switch where he was injured. He was working against time. All of these facts
were uncontroverted by any evidence in the case.
Also uncontroverted was the fact that ice covered
the switch ties at the switch where he was injured and
that i.ce and snow covered the area around the switchstand. The photographs taken by- defendant's employees at 9 o'clock on the morning of the 9th prove without ·any possibil~ty of conflict or controversy that the
condition of the area where plaintiff was injured was
as he alleged it to be. The photographs also show that
the switch points themselves had been cleaned out by
maintenance crews, after the last precipit·ation. In other
words, defendant had adequate time, employees and material with which to have- cleaned the area around the
switch stand where switchmen were required to work
and stand while manipulating the ~witch, but had unfortunately neglected to clean the area around the
switch and make it safe for the switch tenders. Two
other shifts had been at work at the switch b-efore
plaintiff reported for work. Sixteen hours had elapsed
during which time the switch tender on duty could have
taken ·a shovel out to the area of the switch stand and
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cleaned it, or could have reported the condition to the
section foreman in charge of maintenance, who was on
twenty-four hour call. If the railroad company had
kept salt or sand in the shack workmen could have
sprinkled sa.lt or sand over the switch ties, and in the
area "~here men· \Yere required to stand. None of these
precautions were taken.
The railroad clearly owes the absolute and non.delegable duty of exercising reasonable care in furnishing plaintiff with a safe place in which to work, and
while this duty does not require the absolute elimination of all danger, it nevertheless requires and makes
mandatory the elimination of all dangers which the exercise of reasonable· care would remove or guard against.
Plaintiff sincerely contends that the evidence, as
herein outlined, was sufficient for the court to have
granted a directed verdict in favor of the p·laintiff on the
issue of defendant's neglect as a contributing cause of
·plaintiff's injuries, and yet in no less than three instructions does the court invite the jury to find that the sole
proximate cause of his injuries was plaintiff's own cont.ributory negligence. (See· Instructions 17, 18 and 19;
see also the definition of ·proximate cause in Instruction
No. 7, excepted to by plaintiff, where the court completely misconceives the law of multiplicity of causes
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and instructs on the common law doctrine of proximate cause).
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In Melody v. Des Moines Union R. Co., (1913) 161
Iowa 695, 141 N.W. 438, (rehearing denied in (1914,
Iowa) 145 N.W. 466), a switchman who had dismounted
from the engine to throw a switch in the switchyard of
the defendant to allow the cars to be set back upon
another track was injured as he attempted to mount the
footboards of th·e locomotive-his left foot slipping on a
sloping ice ridge and his right foot, which had been lifted
to· the footboard, slipping on the ice accumulated there,
with the result that his grip upon the handhold which
he had seized to assist his movements was broken and he
fell in such a manner that his leg was crushed under the
wheels of the locomotive. In his action charging the
defendant with negligence in failing to supply him with
a safe place to work in that it permitted snow and ice
to accumulate in the yard and upon the footboard of the
locomotive to the peril of_switchmen in the performance
of their duties and failed to remedy or remove such
dangerous condition, it was held, as against the contention of the railroad company that the evidence disclosed no negligence on the p:art of the defendant, that
the issue of negligence was one for the jury. The court
said:
''A switchyard is a switchman's place of work.
The nature of his duties requires him to
traverse the yard in almost every direction, both
day and night. Much of his movements has to
do with the making up, of trains, the coupling,
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uncoupling, assembling, and distribution of cars.
He must move with celerity. The service is at
best essentially dangerous, and he must be ever
alert of eyeJ and of ear to avoid being run over
or caught and crushed between cars. He cannot
always take careful note of his footsteps to
make sure of his path, and within reasonable
limit8 he must and rightfully may rely upon his
employer to see that there are no traps or ·pits
or obstructions into or over which he may fall
to his injury, save only such as pertain to the
proper and necessary preparation and equipment
of the yard for its intended use. True, a railway~
company, having no control over the laws of nature, is not negligent simply because snow falls
upon its yards; but, snow having fallen thereon,
we cannot say, as a matter of law, that the company may without neglect of duty leave it there
indefinitely and permit it to become worn or
trodden into icy mounds, ridges, and slopes at
places where its switchmen are required to go in
the ·performance of their .work, thus exposing
them to the danger of slipping and falling to
their serious injury. The duty of the employer
is to exercise reasonable care to provide his
employees a safe place to work, and is no less
applicable to a switchyard than to a machine
shop. True, the phrase 'safe place to work' is a
relative one. It does not mean the absolute elimination of all danger, but it does mean the elimination of all dangers which the exercise of reasonable care by the employer would remove or guard
against. In the case before us it sufficiently appears that the conditions of which plaintiff com·plains were not the result of falling snow alone,
but also of the use which had been made of the
yard by the defendant whereby the surface of
the yard became. uneven, hard, and slippery.
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Whether reasonable care on defendant's part
would have prevented this source of danger or
caused its removal before the plaintiff's injury
is a question of fact and not of law.''
See also Skidmore v. Baltimore & 0. R . Co., decided M·arch 15, 1948, 167 F. 2d 54, and Randenbush v.

Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 160 F. 2d 363. For other interest.
1ng cases see :
Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459, 68 S.Ct. 140, 162 F .
.2d 716; .Anderson v . .Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry.
Co., 333 U.S. 821,68 S. Ct. 854; Heeb v. New York Central R. Co., 39 N.W. 2d 44, where a railroad worker was
-allowed recovery for frozen feet and the court held that
so-called acts of God will not plague the injured railroad
worker in· this class of cases since the doctrine of assumption of risk has been eliminated in this class of cases.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that Judge Hendricks
abused his legal discretion when he ruled that the jury';;
verdict was based upon passion and prejudice and upon
-that basis forced plaintiff to the choice of a $9,000.00 re·
duction in the verdict or a new trial.
It is further submitted that the instructions to the
jury, given by a second trial court, are fraught with er·
ror prejudicial to the rights of plaintiff.
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We, therefore, respectfully submit that the jury's
verdict at the second trial and judgment there·on should
be set aside and also that the original verdict should
be reinstated.
Respectfully submitted,

RAWLINGS, WALLACE, BLACK,
ROBERTS & BLACK,
Attorneys for .Appellant,

530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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